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Abstract 
Pakistan has consistently performed low on taxation, with revenue collection hovering around 10 percent 
of GDP. Tax reforms have been attempted but without significant gains in revenue collection. Due to the 
recalcitrance of tax revenues, the tax authority attempted to enlist voluntary compliance as one of the 
avenues for its efforts to increase collections. This paper examines the effectiveness of media campaigns 
in the TV and national newspapers used by the Federal Board of Revenues of Pakistan to increase 
awareness, tax filing, and, ultimately, tax morale. We use survey data that were collected in 2014 
immediately after a communication campaign by Pakistan’s Federal Board of Revenue. Using coarsened 
exact matching, we construct treatment and control groups that are nearly identical in terms of pre-
treatment balance of demographic and behavioral predictors of high tax morale. We find improved 
perceptions towards tax compliance in Pakistan for respondents exposed to the TV and newspaper 
advertisements. The choice of the advertisement’s delivery device is important since the latter is more 
effective. Our findings provide empirical evidence that well timed campaigns can enhance voluntary 
compliance in tax filing. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effectiveness of media campaigns in improving attitudes towards tax 
compliance in Pakistan. Tax administrators in many developing countries grapple with tax 
morale under tight administrative budgets, while organizational inertia favors routinized media 
campaigns to improve tax morale and general tax compliance. Perhaps more than any other 
country, this has been the case in Pakistan where for almost two decades the tax revenue to GDP 
ratio has stubbornly remained below 11 percent of GDP despite repeated attempts at tax policy 
reform (Martinez-Vazquez and Cyan, 2015). Other than setting up the usual tax facilitation 
services, such as a Large Taxpayer Unit, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), the nation’s 
premier tax collection agency, has acquired little experience in directly approaching taxpayers to 
motivate higher voluntary tax compliance. Most public information campaigns have been low 
cost efforts relying on mass media to lay out information on tax processes and filing deadlines. 
The motivation behind those initiatives comes from experimental evidence showing that 
increased tax knowledge improves individual perceptions of the fairness of the tax system 
(Eriksen and Fallan, 1996). For example, Kasper, Kogler, and Kirchler (2015) using a survey-
based experiment in Austria show that tax-related media coverage can affect taxpayers’ 
intentions to comply. Taxpayers’ trust of tax authorities may increase when exposed to media 
content that highlights the trustworthy nature of the tax authority or its power to prevent tax 
evasion. And Alm et al., (2010) provide evidence from lab experiments that agency-provided 
information can have a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of filing a tax return as 
well as accurate income tax reporting by individuals.  
However, in Pakistan after the perennial lukewarm response from taxpayers, as a routine every 
year, the filing deadlines are often extended several times. After years of attempting to broaden 
the tax bases of direct taxes, the FBR has not been able to achieve its targets. From 2000 to 2014, 
the number of individuals registered for personal income tax was raised from 0.75 to 3.6 million 
but only with 0.98 million active filers in an estimated 56.5 million people that are employed in 
the country.1 The estimated number of people above the exemption threshold is 5.7 million. In 
the case of corporate income tax, out of the 60 thousand companies that are registered on the  
                                                           
1 IMF (2016); p 5. 
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rolls, only around 25 thousand file returns.2 As Kirchler et al. (2008) argue, when tax authorities 
follow a “cops and robbers” approach, taxpayers will comply only when obliged to do in their 
effort to maximize individual expected utility. This is a finding generalizable to other contexts 
independent of cultural and economic characteristics. Kogler et al. (2013) recover the highest 
level of intended tax compliance and the lowest level of tax evasion in conditions of high trust 
and high power. Empirical evidence from Italy indicates that both coercive and legitimate 
powers were associated with enforced compliance, but, also that enforced compliance leads to 
increased evasion (Kastlunger et al., 2013). In a formalization of the “slippery-slope” framework, 
Prinz et al. (2014) show that tax administrators should follow approaches that express both their 
coercive power as well as their persuasive power to establish tax compliance. Indeed, 
experimental evidence from Greece indicates that increased trust in the tax authorities as well as 
a tougher approach on behalf of the tax authority can enhance voluntary compliance 
(Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2015). Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) emphasize the scope of tax 
morale considerations when conducting fiscal policy for three reasons. First, they offer solutions 
in raising revenues more efficiently since the interaction between the taxpayer and the tax 
authority is taken into account. Second, tax morale research allows for a broad assessment of 
many mechanisms of tax compliance such as deterrence, government regulation, the quality of 
publicly provided goods, the complexity, progressivity and incidence of the tax system and the 
heterogeneous population within a society. Empirical evidence suggests that Pakistan’s 
ethnically fractionalized background could pose a challenge in enhancing tax morale, though (Li, 
2010).  
The case of Pakistan might be salient in its potential taxpayer’s resilience at avoiding various 
types of motivation to improve compliance but, it is by no means unique. Tax administrators aim 
to maximize revenue collection but this cannot be accomplished by simply raising tax rates.3 
Thus, efforts should be made to also enhance tax morale.4 To accomplish this goal, tax 
                                                           
2 ibid.  
3 Kirchler et al. (2007) review the empirical literature of tax compliance and find overwhelming evidence of a 
negative relation between tax rates and compliance.  
4 Luttmer and Singhal (2014) distinguish among five classes of mechanisms affecting tax morale: intrinsic 
motivation, reciprocity, peer and social effects, culture, information imperfections and deviations from utility 
maximization. 
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administrators should consider simplifying the tax code, become more service-oriented and 
introduce a kinder attitude towards taxpayers (Pickhardt and Prinz, 2014). Increasing voluntary 
compliance with the tax code leads to eventually establishing a compliance norm (OECD, 2013).  
In a growing number of countries, tax administration offices have been using field experiments 
to test tax compliance responses to behavioral nudges (Torgler, 2011). However, field 
experiments unfortunately are costlier and much harder to implement relative to simpler media 
campaigns.  Mainly for those reasons, media campaigns remain the staple tool for motivating 
voluntary tax compliance. This persistence in their use and the low tax compliance levels raise 
the question of whether these traditional media campaigns are serving any useful purpose or have 
any identifiable impact. Saeed and Shah (2011) argue that advertising can help in widening the 
tax net, if properly executed. They warn that advertising can be ineffective when tax policy is 
undergoing constant changes. In addition, they stress that media campaigns may have differential 
impact across different age and wealth groups based on each group’s medium of choice.  
The main contribution of this paper is to offer the first quasi-experimental evaluation of the 
effectiveness of different media campaigns used by a tax agency to enhance tax morale and 
increase voluntary compliance. We use a novel, individual-level survey of randomly selected 
Pakistani income tax filers that was conducted after the media campaigns and elicits attitudes 
towards tax compliance. However, only a fraction of the survey respondent was exposed to the 
media campaigns which gives rise to a natural experiment.  We use this source of cross-sectional 
variation to examine the effect of advertisements aired on the TV, printed in the newspapers, or 
both on tax morale. First, our identification strategy exploits the random sample of survey 
respondents to overcome self-selection to exposure to a media campaign. Then, it employs a 
matching procedure that drastically increases the comparability of treated and control 
respondents. The post-matching sample includes control observations with nearly identical 
values of respondents’ predictors of tax morale and news source selection to the treated ones. To 
identify the causal effect of media campaigns on tax morale we compare the average tax morale 
of respondents exposed to the media campaign to the one of respondents not exposed to it using 
a highly-balanced post-matching sample. From a policy perspective, evidence on the 
effectiveness of media campaigns can be extremely important because of the simplicity in  
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implementation, wide reach, and ease of scalability and scope of coverage of mass media 
campaigns. 
Increasingly, tax administration authorities around the world have recognized the centrality of 
non-pecuniary factors to voluntary tax compliance. Acting on that recognition, many country tax 
authorities have enacted a slew of policies in recent years. For example, the Estonian Tax and 
Customs Board carried out information campaigns in 2010 and 2011 to proactively provide 
information on the use of taxes by the state (Eurofound, 2013). Similarly, the Italian government 
resorted to television and print advertising campaigns in 2011 to promote tax compliance 
(Povoledo, 2011). These administrative initiatives have spurred the recent wave of literature of 
field experiments about what motivates firms and individuals to pay their taxes voluntarily 
(Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod, 2001; Castro and Scartascini, 2015; Chirico et al., 2014; 
Del Carpio, 2014; Dwenger et al., 2014; Fellner-Roehling, Sausgruber, and Traxler, 2013; 
Hallsworth et al., 2014; Kleven et al., 2011; Ortega and Scartascini, 2015); Perez-Truglia and 
Troiano, 2015; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian, 2001). However, all the existing evidence to 
this date on the effectiveness of behavioral strategies to enhance tax morale in developing 
countries comes from Latin America. In the context of Chile, Pomeranz (2015) reports that an 
increase in the perceived audit probability of randomly chosen Chilean firms increases 
compliance to the VAT. Castro and Scartascini (2013) found that sanction-based messaging 
successfully generated more property tax revenues to the Argentine tax authority. However, 
appeals to tax fairness and tax equity did not effectively increase property tax revenues. In 
Venezuela, Ortega and Sanguinetti (2013) show that enforcement messaging has the largest 
effect on compliance. This study also suggests that moral suasion is ineffective in bringing about 
taxpayer responses. Del Carpio (2014) finds that a combination of a payment reminder and 
deterrence information enhances tax compliance of a local property tax in Peru because it 
increases the perception of enforcement. In a rare exception to the use of field experiments, 
Sanchez (2014) provides evidence from a low-cost tax compliance campaign in Peru targeting 
firms that misreport their tax obligations. Using a regression-discontinuity approach, he reports 
very substantial increases in tax reporting which implies a very high return for each notification 
intervention by the tax agency. 
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However, in this growing body of literature, the focus of the empirical analysis has almost 
exclusively been on message content rather than device of delivery.  But the mode of 
communication, and not only the content, might play a crucial role in a campaign’s success. The 
early interventions of behavioral tax compliance relied almost exclusively on physical letters as 
the device to nudge taxpayers with only two recent exceptions. Ortega and Scartascini (2015) 
report sizable differences across the effectiveness of a letter, an e-mail, and a personal visit by a 
tax inspector in a field experiment of the National Tax Agency in Colombia. Koumpias (2016), 
in a 2013 natural experiment by the Tax Compliance Unit of the Greek Treasury, shows that the 
impact of payment deadline reminder phone calls on tax payments, relative to e-mails, is 
markedly different. In a somewhat different domain of citizen behavior, there is substantial 
empirical evidence of similar nudges given through impersonal methods like robotic phone 
messages (Ramirez, 2005; Shaw et al., 2012) and emails (Stollwerk, 2006) as being ineffective in 
changing voting behavior. On the contrary, face-to-face canvassing (Gerber and Green, 2000) 
and phone calls (Imai, 2005; Arceneaux, 2007; Nickerson, 2006; Arceneaux and Nickerson, 
2006) are associated with larger behavioral responses than non-personalized methods such as 
flyers. Thus, not only the content of the nudge may matter for enhancing tax morale but also the 
means for its delivery.  
2. Data 
We use survey data that were collected in 2014 immediately after a communication campaign by 
Pakistan’s Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).5 The campaign was financed by the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) that supports FBR’s external 
communications interventions. In advance of the 2013-14 tax return submission deadline, the 
DFID assisted the implementation of a short-term FBR External Communications Awareness 
Raising Pilot Campaign through its service provider, Adam Smith International. In preparation  
 
                                                           
5 There have been earlier attempts to elicit taxpayers’ perceptions towards tax compliance in Pakistan. Mughal and 
Akram (2012) survey taxpayers to determine predictors of tax avoidance and evasion in Pakistan. Awan and Hannan 
(2014) survey taxpayers and tax officers and Khan and Ahmad (2014) survey students’ attitudes about tax 
compliance to elicit determinants of tax evasion in southern Punjab, Pakistan. However, the studies are mainly 
descriptive based on small-scaled, primary data collection attempts, not initiated by the FBR, that might not be 
nationally representative. 
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for this campaign, Adam Smith International commissioned Semiotics Consultants Private 
Limited to undertake a Baseline Taxpayer Perception Survey of eligible individuals across  
Pakistan’s four provinces to inform FBR of the existing tax return filing dynamics. The FBR 
used this evidence to understand the underlying perceptions of eligible taxpayers about tax filing 
and design of the pilot communication campaign. Upon completion of the Pilot Campaign, 
Semiotics Consultants was selected to conduct a follow-up perception survey. The survey data 
we use contain information about the extent of shift in taxpayer attitude, tax return filing 
behavior as well as the reach and efficacy of the communication instruments deployed. 
The follow-up perception survey took place in major metropolitan areas across the country in 
line with the baseline survey. Metropolitan areas were selected based on major industry and 
economic activity locations, thereby having a higher proportion of eligible tax filers.  Thus, ten 
(10) metropolitan areas were identified in the four (4) provinces. Equal apportioning across the 
metropolitan areas was adequate to obtain public perceptions regarding tax return filing and the 
communications campaign given the province-wide metropolitan area/eligible tax-payer spread.  
Since the number of eligible taxpayers was unknown, a minimum number of individuals was 
taken at which skewness and kurtosis becomes irrelevant. From each metropolitan area, around 
200 tax eligible individuals were selected at random resulting in a total sample of 2,000 across 
10 areas. Selection of tax return filers and non-filers took place from the same localities where 
the baseline perception survey had taken place. Only those individuals who were eligible to pay 
tax based on their responses were selected for the survey. As a result of visits to multiple 
localities within a metropolitan area, individuals from a mix of economic sectors were targeted 
(e.g., salaried and non-salaried individuals deriving incomes from other sources).  
Our dependent variable is constructed from survey responses to the statement “Cheating on taxes 
in Pakistan is never justifiable”. The framing hints towards outright illegal tax evasion which 
ensures that taxpayers do not convey their perceptions about legal practices with similar effects 
on tax revenue yields such as tax avoidance or tax flight which are known to be evaluated 
differently (Kirchler et al., 2003). The answers were recorded on a scale from 1 to 5 but we 
collapse the ordinal information to an indicator variable, as is customary in the empirical tax 
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morale literature. Our outcome variable, 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖, takes the value of one if respondent 𝑖 
strongly agreed, or agreed to the previous statement and zero if respondent 𝑖 neither agreed nor 
disagreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed to the previous statement. Thus, our measure captures 
positive attitudes towards tax compliance; i.e., respondents with high tax morale.  
3. Methods 
3.1 Identification Strategy 
To identify the causal effect of the media campaigns in raising tax morale, we need to compare 
respondents who would have otherwise had identical tax morale, on average, and were randomly 
exposed to the media campaign with those that were not. To circumvent the endogenous exposure 
of individuals to the media campaign and its delivery device (e.g. TV, newspapers, social media) 
we use a sample of randomly selected, eligible tax-filers in Pakistan. We further control for 
selection of media device by matching on the respondent’s selected news source Next, we employ 
matching techniques to ensure that, in the absence of the media campaign, treated and control 
respondents would exhibit comparable tax morale. We achieve this by matching on documented 
predictors of high tax morale. The Baseline Taxpayer Perception Survey provides the “training 
dataset” which the empirical literature has used to uncover the determinants of tax morale in 
Pakistan (Cyan, Koumpias and Martinez-Vazquez, 2016). Based on this pre-treatment evidence, 
we match on tax morale predictors identified as most significant in the previous literature. To 
identify the effect of the media campaigns, we regress the tax morale outcome variable on a 
constant and the treatment variable using matching weights. 
3.2 Coarsened Exact Matching 
The key goal of matching is to prune observations from the data so that the remaining data have 
better balance between the treated and control respondents; that is, make the empirical distributions 
of the covariates (𝑿) more similar (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2011). Exact matching matches a treated 
respondent to all of the controls with exactly the same covariate values. Typically, this procedure 
leads to very small sample sizes for the control group. However, it requires no additional adjusting 
and a difference in means estimator finds the causal effect. Approximate matching methods find 
controls that are close to the treated respondent. This is often done on the basis of statistics such 
as the Mahalanobis distance, the propensity score (the probability of being treated, conditional on  
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the covariates), or coarsened exact matches. In this case, controlling for 𝑿 in a typical regression-
like form is necessary. The benefits of matching are that estimates suffer from less bias, are less 
model-dependent, and more efficient (Ho et al., 2007). 
Coarsened Exact Matching 
CEM separates the observations in strata of identical coarsened values for covariates. Then, the 
observations coming from strata that do not retain both a treated and a control respondent are 
removed. Next, CEM assigns weights to matched and unmatched respondents such that all 
differences across treatment and control groups (imbalances) are eliminated. Specifically, the 
CEM treats multivariate non-linearities, interactions, moments, quantiles, comoments, and any 
distributional differences up to the chosen level of coarsening (Iacus, King, amd Porro, 2011). 
The inherent trade-off of matching is reflected in CEM too: larger bins (more coarsening) will 
result in fewer strata. Fewer strata will result in more diverse observations within the same strata 
and, thus, higher imbalance. It is important to note that CEM prunes both treated and control 
respondents. This process changes the quantity of interest under study to the treatment effect in 
the post matching subsample. Specifically, our estimand is the sample average treatment effect on 
the treated (SATT). That is, we focus on the average treatment effect on tax morale for those 
exposed to the media campaigns in the post-matching sample. 
In Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix we show that results from a naïve estimation on the 
unprocessed, the pre-matching sample are fairly comparable in terms of direction (sign) but not 
statistical significance to the post-matching estimates. This provides internal validity to our main 
CEM-weighted Estimates as it illustrates that results are not very sensitive to the research design. 
And more importantly, establishes that the quantity of interest does change substantially despite 
pruning. Thus, inference can be drawn about the entirety of the nationally representative sample. 
CEM makes an explicit statement about the initial level of covariate imbalance between treated 
respondents and untreated ones. Furthermore, it provides with the margin of covariate balance 
improvement in percentage terms after matching. This provides a transparent indication of the 
extent to which the CEM-weighted Estimates have a causal interpretation. The overall imbalance 
is given by the 𝐿1 statistic, introduced in Iacus, King and Porro (2008) as a comprehensive measure 
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of global imbalance. It is based on the 𝐿1 difference between the multidimensional histogram of 
all pretreatment covariates in the treated group and that in the control group. This measure includes 
imbalance with respect to the full joint distribution, including all interactions, of the covariates. 
Thus, 𝐿1 works for imbalance as 𝑅
2 works for model fit: the absolute values mean less than 
comparisons between matching solutions. Perfect global balance (up to coarsening) is indicated 
by  𝐿1 = 0, and larger values indicate larger imbalance between the groups, with a maximum of  
𝐿1 = 1, which indicates complete separation. 
4. Results 
4.1 TV Ad Campaign 
Next, we compute the 𝐿1 statistic, as well as several unidimensional measures of imbalance 
between the distributions of the predictors of tax morale for respondents who were exposed to 
the TV ad and the control group. 
Table 1: Covariate Imbalance between Respondents Exposed to TV Ad and Controls 
Multivariate  𝐿1 Distance = 0.58842155 
Univariate Imbalance Indicators: 
 𝐿1
a Meanb Minc 25%c 50%e 75%c Maxc 
Female 0.105 0.105 0 0 0 1 0 
Self-employed 0.01322 0.01322 0 0 0 0 0 
Pensioner 0.00353 -0.00353 0 0 0 0 0 
High-school 0.03662 -0.03662 0 0 0 0 0 
Master’s 0.04287 0.04287 0 0 0 0 0 
Vocational 0.00211 -0.00211 0 0 0 0 0 
News Source 0.05795 -0.04789 0 0 0 0 0 
Balochistan 0.05073 -0.05073 0 0 0 0 0 
Kpk 0.03097 0.03097 0 0 0 0 0 
Punjab 0.01064 0.01064 0 0 0 0 0 
Sindh 0.00912 0.00912 0 0 0 0 0 
Good Use of Tax 0.03486 0.03486 0 0 0 0 0 
Tax doesn’t Affect Investment 0.01051 0.01051 0 0 0 0 0 
Recurring Government Spending 0.00671 0.00671 0 0 0 0 0 
FBR will not Audit 0.01428 0.01428 0 0 0 0 0 
Filing Tax a Social Responsibility 0.00217 -0.00217 0 0 0 0 0 
Richer Pay More Taxes 0.00403 0.00403 0 0 0 0 0 
Tax System is Fair 0.01871 -0.01871 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes:  
a Univariate distance.  
b Difference in means. 
c Difference in empirical quintile at 0, 25th, 50th, 75th, 100th percentile.  
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The first column, labeled 𝐿1, reports the 𝐿𝑗1 measure, which is 𝐿1 computed for the jth variable 
separately (which of course does not include interactions). The second column of Table 1, 
labeled mean, reports the difference in means. The remaining columns in the table report the 
difference in the empirical quintiles of the distributions of the two groups for the 0th (min), 25th, 
50th, 75th, and 100th (max) percentiles for each variable. 
For instance, the first row of the table suggests that the indicator variable of female sex is 
somewhat balanced in the raw data in means but completely separated in the 75% quintile of the 
two distributions. This table also illustrates the point that balancing only the means between the 
treated and control groups does not necessarily guarantee balance in the rest of the distribution. 
The age variable (continuous) is imbalanced in different directions, denoted by positive and 
negative signs, across different quintiles of its overall distribution.  
Still, the most important metric of covariate balance is the overall 𝐿1 measure. Even if the 
marginal distribution of every variable is perfectly balanced, the joint distribution can still be 
highly imbalanced. The multivariate  𝐿1 distance of 0.58842155 indicates that predictor values 
of tax morale determinants in Pakistan between those exposed to the TV ad and those who did 
not come across any FBR communication campaign are fairly non-comparable.  
Effect of TV Ad Campaign on Tax Morale 
The output contains useful information about the match, including a (small) table about the 
number of observations in total, matched, and unmatched by treatment group. Since CEM 
bounds the imbalance ex ante, the most important information is the number of observations 
matched. But the results also give the imbalance in the matched data using the same measures as 
that in the original data. 
First, we apply the CEM algorithm for a set of demographic matching criteria that has been 
found to be significant determinants of tax morale in Pakistan. We stratify the sample in 132 
strata and match on 56 of them. This yields a total of 1,444 observations comprised of 365 
respondents exposed to the TV ad and 1079 as controls. That is, 21 treated and 145 untreated 
observations were discarded because they take outlier values for significant determinants of tax 
morale. This produces a very substantial reduction in imbalance, not only in the means, but also 
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in the marginal and joint distributions of the data. The post matching multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 
3.619𝑒−15 ≈ 0 indicates almost perfect global balance. 
Next, we introduce more matching criteria based on behavioral factors of tax morale. The 
stratification gives rise to 555 distinct strata and we are able to match 131 of them. This produces 
a total of 959 observations comprised of 290 respondents exposed to the TV ad and 669 as 
controls. This process prunes 96 treated and 555 untreated observations from the sample. Again, 
the reduction in imbalance is very large but the introduction of more matching variables, even, 
led to a slight improvement; multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 1. 208𝑒
−15 ≈ 0. 
Both matching exercises, lead to almost identical treated and control groups in terms of pre-
treatment covariate balance. Recall that in exact matching, conditional on covariates, the 
potential outcomes are independent of actual treatment. In other words, selection bias disappears 
after conditioning on covariates. Since 𝐿1 is approximately equal to zero, CEM effectively 
achieves nearly exact matching. Then, the estimated difference in mean tax morale provides an 
estimate of the treatment effect that may have a causal interpretation; that is, assuming we did 
not omit important predictors of tax morale.  
Table 2: CEM-weighted Estimates: Effect of TV Ad Campaign on Tax Moralea 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES High Tax Morale Indicatorb Ordinal Tax Moralec High Tax Morale Indicatorb Ordinal Tax Moralec 
     
TV Ad 0.381*d 0.175 0.297 0.178 
 (0.213)e (0.111) (0.252) (0.117) 
Constant -0.886***  -0.851***  
 (0.260)  (0.321)  
Observations 1,444 1,444 959 959 
Notes:  
a Results are based on the post-matching sample using CEM weights and reported at mean values.  
b Outcome is an indicator taking the value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees that 
“cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable” and zero, otherwise. 
c Outcome is an ordinal measure of whether “cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable”.  
d *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
e Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level. 
  
In columns (1) and (3) of Table 2, we estimate probit regressions of whether the respondent has 
high tax morale. In columns (2) and (4), we estimate ordered probit regressions of the respondent 
attitudes towards tax morale,  respectively, matching only on demographic, then both 
demographic and behavioral factors of tax morale. 
We find that the TV ad had a positive and significant effect on positive attitudes towards tax  
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compliance when we match on significant demographic determinants of tax morale. However, 
when we introduce more stringent matching criteria, and, subsequently, reduce power, the effect 
becomes smaller and is not significant at conventional levels anymore.  
Also, we show that the TV ad did shift attitudes towards tax morale when exploring its ordinal 
measures. The overall effect is positive but smaller and not significant. We also provide 
estimates for the ancillary parameters which are used to differentiate the adjacent levels of the 
response variable. Interpretation of the ordered probit estimates is independent of the ancillary 
parameters. 
4.2 Newspaper Ad Campaign 
Next, we explore the impact of the newspaper ad campaign on perceptions about tax compliance. 
Table 3 below displays the distributional differences of variables that determine attitudes towards 
tax compliance between respondents who read the newspaper ad only and the controls group.   
Table 3: Covariate Imbalance between Respondents Exposed to Newspaper Ad and Controls 
Multivariate  𝐿1 Distance = 0.65162413 
Univariate Imbalance Indicators: 
 𝐿1
a Meanb Minc 25%c 50%c 75%c Maxc 
Female 0.04508 -0.04508 0 0 0 0 0 
Self-employed 0.05036 -0.05036 0 0 0 0 0 
Pensioner 0.00621 0.00621 0 0 0 0 0 
High-school 0.01477 -0.01477 0 0 0 0 0 
Master’s 0.04882  0.04882 0 0 0 0 0 
Vocational 0.00135 0.00135 0 0 0 0 0 
News Source 0.19594 -0.27191 0 0 0 0 -1 
Balochistan 0.00432 -0.00432 0 0 0 0 0 
Kpk 0.02404    -0.02404 0 0 0 0 0 
Punjab 0.02776 0.02776 0 0 0 0 0 
Sindh 0.0006 0.0006 0 0 0 0 0 
Good Use of Tax 0.0293 0.0293 0 0 0 0 0 
Tax doesn’t Affect Investment 0.00189 0.00189 0 0 0 0 0 
Recurring Government Spending 0.02808 0.02808 0 0 0 0 0 
FBR will not Audit 0.0353 0.0353 0 0 0 0 0 
Filing Tax a Social Responsibility 0.02874 0.02874 0 0 0 0 0 
Richer Pay More Taxes 0.0148 0.0148 0 0 0 0 0 
Tax System is Fair 0.04571 -0.04571 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes:  
a Univariate distance.  
b Difference in means. 
c Difference in empirical quintile at 0, 25th, 50th, 75th, 100th percentile.  
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The multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 0.65162413 in Table 3 indicates that the pre-treatment predictor 
values of tax morale determinants in Pakistan between those exposed to the newspaper ad and 
those who did not come across any FBR communication campaign are fairly distinct. In fact, the 
separation of covariates values of those exposed to the newspaper ad relative to the control 
respondents is more acute than of those exposed to the TV ad. Note that for all predictors, but the 
“News Source” variable, the univariate imbalance is equivalent to the absolute value of the mean 
pre-treatment predictor difference between those exposed to the newspaper ad and the control.6  
Effect of Newspaper Ad Campaign on Tax Morale 
Similarly to the TV ad campaign, we, initially, match on statistically significant demographic 
determinants of tax morale in Pakistan. We stratify the sample in 123 strata and match on 44 of 
them. This leaves us with a total of 1,153 observations comprised of 194 respondents exposed to 
the newspaper ad and 959 as controls. Alternatively, CEM prunes 5 treated and 265 untreated 
observations away from the sample on the basis on non-comparability. Again, this leads to an 
extremely balanced post-matching sample with a multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 2.443𝑒
−15 ≈ 0. 
To ensure our estimates of the effect of the newspaper ad campaign on tax morale are not subject 
to omitted variables bias from the exclusion of characteristics that have been found to determine 
tax morale in Pakistan, we match on additional behavioral factors. This increases the 
dimensionality of matching substantially as it produces 518 strata where we match on 76 of 
them. This generates a post-matching sample of 631 observations comprised of 154 respondents 
exposed to the newspaper ad and 477 as controls or, equivalently, discarding 45 treated and 747 
untreated observations. Pre-processing the observations leads to a very balanced sample again 
(multivariate 𝐿1 distance of 2.672𝑒
−15). However, the reduction in imbalance is negligible 
which, in turn, casts doubt over the necessity of matching on behavioral factors. 
Since the multivariate 𝐿1 distance in both post-matching samples is infinitesimally low the 
coefficient of the newspaper variable reveals the SATT of exposure to the newspaper ad 
campaign on tax morale. In columns (1) and (3) of Table 4, we estimate probit regressions of 
whether the respondent has high tax morale, respectively. In columns (2) and (4), we estimate 
ordered probit regressions of the respondent attitude towards tax morale matching on  
                                                           
6 A similar pattern can be deduced from the Covariate Imbalance table with regards to the TV campaign as well. 
This is, generally, the case when the predictor variable is an indicator. 
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demographic only, and demographic and behavioral factors of tax morale, respectively.  
Table 4: CEM-weighted Estimates: Effect of Newspaper Ad Campaign on Tax Moralea 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES High Tax Morale Indicatorb Ordinal Tax Moralec Ordinal Tax Moraleb Ordinal Tax Moralec 
     
Newspaper Ad 0.418*d 0.268* 0.528** 0.368** 
 (0.224)e (0.160) (0.264) (0.167) 
Constant -0.802***  -0.877***  
 (0.242)  (0.264)  
Observations 1,153 1,153 631 631 
Notes:  
a Results are based on the post-matching sample using CEM weights and reported at mean values.  
b Outcome is an indicator taking the value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees that 
“cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable” and zero, otherwise. 
c Outcome is an ordinal measure of whether “cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable”. 
d *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
e Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level. 
 
Our findings suggest that the newspaper ad campaign had a positive and significant effect on 
positive attitudes towards tax compliance over both sets of matching criteria. As a matter of fact, 
when we introduce more stringent matching criteria, the effect is not attenuated but becomes 
larger and more significant. These results provide convincing evidence that newspaper ad 
campaigns can causally enhance tax morale in Pakistan. Contrary to the TV ad, the results based 
on ordinal measures of tax morale indicate that the newspaper ad campaign had a positive and 
significant effect on attitudes towards tax compliance. The fact that this result is detectable even 
from a relative underpowered test based on a smaller sample to what is available for the test of 
TV ad effectiveness, highlights that newspapers were substantially more effectively as a nudging 
device.  
4.3 Combined TV and Newspaper Advertisement Campaigns 
In this section, we investigate the cumulative impact of exposure to the TV ad and the newspaper 
ad campaigns, an underpowered test as only 84 respondents were exposed to both ads.  
Table 5: Covariate Imbalance between Respondents Exposed to both Ads and Controls 
Multivariate  𝐿1 Distance = 0.77077498 
Univariate Imbalance Indicators: 
 𝐿1
a Meanb Minc 25%c 50%e 75%c Maxc 
Female 0.12745 0.12745 0 0 0 1 0 
Self-employed 0.03606 -0.03606 0 0 0 0 0 
Pensioner 0.01389 -0.01389 0 0 0 0 -1 
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High-school 0.0859 -0.0859 0 0 0 0 0 
Master’s 0.12115 0.12115 0 0 0 0 0 
Vocational 0.0056 0.0056 0 0 0 0 0 
News Source 0.24195 -0.39461 0 0 0 -1 0 
Balochistan 0.13142 0.13142 0 0 0 0 0 
Kpk 0.16235   -0.16235   0 0 0 0 0 
Punjab 0.02871 -0.02871 0 0 -1 0 0 
Sindh 0.05964 0.05964 0 0 0 0 0 
Good Use of Tax 0.00525 0.00525 0 0 0 0 0 
Tax doesn’t Affect Investment 0.04914 -0.04914 0 0 0 0 0 
Recurring Government Spending 0.02521 0.02521 0 0 0 0 0 
FBR will not Audit 0.22351 0.22351 0 0 1 0 0 
Filing Tax a Social Responsibility 0.02288 0.02288 0 0 0 0 0 
Richer Pay More Taxes 0.01984 -0.01984 0 0 0 0 0 
Tax System is Fair 0.05707 -0.05707 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes:  
a Univariate distance.  
b Difference in means. 
c Difference in empirical quintile at 0, 25th, 50th, 75th, 100th percentile.  
 
Table 5 above that the multivariate  𝐿1 distance of 0.77077498 suggests that the pre-treatment 
predictor values of tax morale determinants in Pakistan between those exposed to both the TV ad 
and the newspaper ad relative to the control group are very different. This is the largest covariate 
imbalance in any treatment group we examine which merits matching even more important. 
Cumulative Effect of TV Ad and Newspaper Ad Campaign on Tax Morale 
Matching on demographics only disaggregates the sample to 118 strata where we match on 28. 
The post-matching sample is comprised of 84 treated respondents and 624 controls, a total of 708 
observations. The matching algorithm excludes 600, untreated only, observations from the post-
matching sample. The multivariate 𝐿1 distance is equal to 1.026𝑒
−15(≈ 0) which translates to an 
approximately fully balanced sample. 
Introducing behavioral factors in the matching process appears to have a substantial effect on the 
estimand as CEM prunes 16 treated observations and 923 untreated ones. The resulting post-
matching sample contains 301 untreated and 68 treated units over 43 matched strata (out of a 
total of 489 strata). Given this set of predictors, the multivariate 𝐿1 distance is equal to 
1.562𝑒−15(≈ 0). 
In columns (1) and (3), we estimate probit regressions of whether the respondent has high tax 
morale,  respectively.  In columns (2) and (4), we estimate ordered probit regressions of the  
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respondent attitude towards tax morale matching on demographic only, and demographic and 
behavioral factors of tax morale, respectively.   
Table 6: CEM-weighted Estimates: Effect of Double Nudge on Tax Moralea 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES High Tax Morale Indicatorb Ordinal Tax Moralec High Tax Moraleb Ordinal Tax Moralec 
TV & Newspaper Ads -0.0822d -0.154 -0.0199 -0.145 
 (0.532)e (0.319) (0.619) (0.347) 
Constant -0.592**  -0.609*  
 (0.242)  (0.312)  
Observations 708 708 369 369 
Notes:  
a Results are based on the post-matching sample using CEM weights and reported at mean values.  
b Outcome is an indicator taking the value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees that 
“cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable” and zero, otherwise. 
c Outcome is an ordinal measure of whether “cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable”. 
d *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
e Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level. 
 
The analysis lacks power to identify any statistically significant effects of exposure to both ads. 
The table above shows that the overall cumulative effect of both the TV and the newspaper ad 
campaigns was zero independent of matching criteria. Interestingly, these findings point towards 
the potential of tax morale fatigue following repeated behavioral nudging on behalf of the tax 
agency. But, as aforementioned, these estimates should be taken with a grain of salt; the sample 
size is not sufficiently large to engage in truly meaningful inference.  
5. Robustness Checks 
Finally, we assess the robustness of our findings based on the high tax morale indicator outcome 
to the choice of matching method. Table 7 below presents results from two popular alternative 
matching procedures to CEM; namely, propensity score matching and matching based on the 
Mahalanobis distance. The latter is based on the assumption that the controls follow a normal (or 
elliptic distribution) whereas the former holds if the model of the propensity score is not 
misspecified. However, we dismiss both of those concerns on the following grounds. First, 
random sampling of the survey respondents guarantees that the controls are normally distributed. 
Second, the availability of a pre-intervention as a training sample allows us to identify the 
statistically significant determinants of tax morale in Pakistan and prevent misspecification. The 
resulting covariate balance between treatment and control confirms that the propensity score was 
correctly specified. 
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Table 7: Effect of Media Campaigns on Tax Morale: Robustness across Matching Methodsa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment PSM Mahalanobis 
Distance 
PSM ` Mahalanobis 
Distance 
Exposed to TV Ad 0.085*b 0.172* 0.135*** 0.141** 
 (0.059)c (0.096) (0.033) (0.054) 
Exposed to Paper Ad 0.217** 0.139*** 0.145** 0.149* 
 (0.076) (0.032) (0.046) (0.082) 
Exposed to both TV and Paper Ad 0.055 -0.083 0.010 0.058  
 (0.088) (0.140) (0.063) (0.099) 
Matching on Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matching on Behavioral Controls No No Yes Yes 
Notes:  
a Results are based on the post-matching samples using propensity score weights and reported at mean 
values. Outcome is an indicator taking the value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees that 
“cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable” and zero, otherwise. 
b *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
c Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level. 
 
Relative to CEM, the results are fairly robust with respect to the sign of the coefficient but not 
the magnitudes. Specifically, the estimated effects from PSM and from matching on the 
Mahalanobis distance suggest that the behavioral response is smaller. Nevertheless, the main 
takeaways remain the same independent of matching procedure. PSM findings suggest that the 
paper ad brings about a stronger behavioral change in respondents’ attitudes towards tax 
compliance relative to the TV ad. Results from matching on the Mahalanobis distance implies 
the same for the full model that includes behavioral covariates as well. In confirmation of the 
CEM findings, exposure to both a TV and a newspaper ad has null effects on tax compliance. 
This evidence does not dismiss the possibility that multiple behavioral nudging on behalf of the 
tax agency can lead to tax morale fatigue.    
However, it should be noted that the balance achieved with CEM is superior. PSM and matching 
on Mahalanobis distance do not discard as many observations as CEM does. This leads to post-
matching estimated effects which are generally not very different to the ones from the raw, pre-
processed sample. Moreover, PSM and Mahalanobis matching lead to net improvements in terms 
of overall bias reduction but perform worse for some variables. On the other hand, CEM leads to 
improvements across the board at the expense of power by discarding more non-comparable 
observations. Therefore, we interpret the results of the robustness checks as a general  
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confirmation of the main analysis. The discrepancy could be attributed to the inferior balance 
achieved with the alternative matching methods. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the effect of different media campaigns in Pakistan on the underlying tax 
morale of tax filing-eligible individuals who were exposed to them. Using a novel survey data of 
Pakistani income tax filers, we show via CEM that both TV and newspaper ads can improve 
individual perceptions towards tax compliance in Pakistan. Moreover, we find that the effect of 
the newspaper ad is stronger than the effect of the TV ad. This result underlines the importance 
of the delivery device for the efficacy of the media campaign. It could be explained by the 
underlying selection of exposure into the two media. It is reasonable to assume that the 
newspapers readers are more educated, more senior and at a better socio-economic status than 
those who saw the TV ad, on average. Recall that CEM equalizes the differences in 
characteristics between those exposed to the TV ad and the newspaper ad relative to the control 
group but not with respect to each other. Thus, the larger magnitude of the newspaper ad might 
be simply due to the fact the respondent exposed to it exhibit characteristics that are known to 
lead to superior tax compliance outcomes.  
Kleven and Waseem (2013) show that Pakistani taxpayers’ earnings do respond to pecuniary 
incentives presented by the distortionary nature of notched incentive schemes of the tax code. 
We illustrate the potential for behavioral shifting of attitudes towards tax compliance using non-
pecuniary, moral suassion incentives presented by the FBR in the form of ads in media 
campaigns. We provide empirical evidence that well timed campaigns can enhance voluntary 
compliance. Even if such campaigns may not shift norms permanently, they could produce 
marginal effects on filing making them worthwhile to tax administration.   
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APPENDIX: 
Within the limited timeframe, a 
strategic sampling strategy was 
used to ensure significance and 
efficiency to allow for adequate 
analysis to take place.   
 
From each metropolitan area, 
around 200 tax eligible individuals 
were selected at random resulting 
in a total sample of 2,000 across 
10 areas. 
 
Naïve OLS Estimates: Effect of Different Nudging Devices on Tax Morale 
 
Table A.1: Unadjusted OLS Estimates of Effect of Media Campaigns on Tax Moralea 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TV Newspapers TV & Newspaper Ads Third Devices 
TV 0.175b    
 (0.148)c    
Newspapers  0.308*   
  (0.167)   
TV & Newspaper Ads   -0.0209  
   (0.492)  
Third Devices    1.038** 
    (0.461) 
Constant -0.691*** -0.688*** -0.654*** -0.684*** 
 (0.228) (0.222) (0.231) (0.222) 
Observations 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 
Notes:  
a Results are based on the raw sample using no weights and reported at mean values. Outcome is an 
indicator taking the value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees that “cheating on taxes in 
Pakistan is never justifiable” and zero, otherwise. Explanatory variables include the treatment indicator 
and a constant. 
b *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
c Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the locality level. 
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Table A.2: Unadjusted OLS Estimates of Effect of Media Campaigns on Tax Moralea 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TV Newspapers TV & Newspaper Ads Third Devices 
TV 0.0386b    
 (0.0985)c    
Newspaper  0.177   
  (0.116)   
TV & Newspaper Ads   -0.131  
   (0.290)  
Third Devices    0.901* 
    (0.500) 
Constant  -0.871*** -0.861*** -0.884*** -0.864*** 
 (0.196) (0.203) (0.211) (0.204) 
Observations 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 
Notes:  
a Results are based on the raw sample using no weights and reported at mean values. Outcome is an 
ordinal measure of whether “cheating on taxes in Pakistan is never justifiable”.  a Explanatory variables 
include the treatment indicator and a constant. 
b *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Musharraf Cyan is a Senior Research Associate at the International Center for Public Policy in 
the Department of Economics at Georgia State University. He has worked over twenty years in 
the areas of public services, fiscal decentralization, tax reform and development planning. He has 
consulted for organizations including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and United 
Nations and has worked as a local administrator and chief economist in Pakistan. Cyan holds a 
degree in medicine from King Edward Medical University, Pakistan, and a Master’s degree from 
University College, London. 
 
 




Antonios Koumpias is an Economics Ph.D. candidate at Georgia State University and Graduate 
Research Assistant at the International Center for Public Policy. His primary research interests 
include public and health economics. In his dissertation, he examines the impact of government 
policies on firms and individuals in the fields of tax policy, healthcare and corruption in public 
administration. Koumpias holds a Master’s in Economics from Duke University and a 
Bachelor’s in Economics from the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece. 
Martinez-Vazquez: 
 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez is Regents Professor of Economics at Georgia State University and 
Director of the International Center for Public Policy. He has published over 20 books and 
numerous articles in academic journals, such as Econometrica and Journal of Political Economy. 
He has consulted with federal agencies and state governments in the United States and over 80 
countries including Russia, China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Mexico with World Bank, IMF, 
USAID, ADB and IDB programs. He has directed numerous projects including the $20 million 
USAID Fiscal Reform Project in the Russian Federation (1997-2000). He is the recipient of 
numerous prizes and awards. 
  
 
 
 
 
